4 dramatic ways from hearing it vocalize. Smelling unfamiliar odors and hearing musical sounds make it intuitive to think of each sense as experientially distinctive. Furthermore, the modalities differ in their effects. Each grounds different sorts of beliefs and actions. When riding your bike, thanks to vision, you come to believe a pedestrian is crossing the street ahead; thanks to hearing, you get out of the way of the car approaching from behind.
This perspective, and the methodology, would be viable if experiences associated with the different senses were entirely experientially discrete or encapsulated, or if they were exhausted by distinctive or sense-specific phenomenology. It would be defensible if the senses had disjointed functions, or if they were entirely causally independent or physiologically isolated.
The evidence, however, suggests that we should abandon this perspective. Perceiving is richly multimodal. Perceptual processes involve extensive interaction among sensory modalities.
The patterns of interaction demonstrate significant functional cooperation among the senses.
Adequately accounting for multimodal processes-those that involve interaction or coordination among more than one sense-suggests that explaining what happens in one modality requires appeal to others. The senses thus are not causally, functionally, or explanatorily independent. We may see and hear, but what we see depends upon what we hear. I will suggest that this extends even to perceptual experience, where the products of such cooperation are evident in multimodal perceptual content and phenomenology. Any adequate philosophical understanding of perception and perceptual content should explain the respects in which perception is multimodal.
Attention to the multimodal aspects of perception challenges common assumptions about the content and phenomenology of perception, and about the individuation and psychological nature of sense modalities. Multimodal perception thus presents a valuable opportunity for a case 5 study in mature interdisciplinary cognitive science. This chapter aims to raise these issues against the historical background of unimodal approaches in the study of perception. It presents some of the central empirical findings concerning multimodality, and it explains the philosophical implications of these findings. Foremost, it aims to encourage and open avenues for future research.
Some varieties of multimodality
We should from the start distinguish several ways in which perception could be multimodal.
Though not exhaustive, this will help to highlight the targets.
First, we perceive thanks to several senses. Intuitively, we see, hear, touch, taste, and smell. The commonsense distinctions among sense modalities might correspond to folk psychological categories used to explain different ways of acquiring empirical beliefs or different patterns of responding to some surroundings. Seeing makes you believe that the car across the street is purple, and hearing makes you turn your head toward the collision. These categories perhaps are etiologically grounded in differences to perceptual experience that are recognizable from the first person-nobody would mistake a current experience of seeing a purple car for hearing. But a great deal of science also has taught us in fascinating detail about the physiological differences among the eyes, ears, skin, tongue, and nose. It has taught us about nerves and brain activity, and about the evolution and function of sensory organs and pathways.
It is not trivial to say that we perceive with different sense modalities, but it is a weak claim that in this respect alone perception is multimodal.
Despite their differences, the senses work in concert. Sensing frequently occurs in a multimodal context, among sources that collectively or individually stimulate more than one 6 modality. Sensory organs and pathways are not activated entirely in isolation.
Activity in the different senses is responsible for your overall perceptual experience at any given time. Right now, I hear some music and feel a breeze, see a sandwich and taste a sour candy. But although perceptual experience comprises experiences drawn from the different senses, it does not seem fragmented or disjointed. There is a strong sense in which one's visual experience, auditory experience, tactile experience, and so on, make up a single composite experience with visual, auditory, tactile, and so on, aspects or components. In this respect, perceptual experience is multimodally unified (see, e.g., Tye, 2003; Bayne and Chalmers, 2003) .
Certain experiences, however, seem to belong together in a stronger sense, as when you both hold and see a fuzzy yellow tennis ball, or when you reach up to a location in space to grab a tennis ball you see approaching. Or when you taste something you smell. In these cases, sets of experiences associated with different sense modalities are integrated in a way that other unified experiences, such as concurrent experiences of tasting some wine and seeing some flowers, are not. They are not merely co-conscious and do not simply constitute a conjoint experience.
Experiences with quite different subject matter might be unified in the sense above, but integration involves experiences that concern a common perceptible object or feature. Integration is unification of experiences that are the same with respect to what is perceived, rather than just unification among experiences that concern different things (integration thus is closely related to what Bayne and Chalmers (2003) 
call objectual unity).
A natural question, given the dramatic differences among experiences associated with different senses, is how they could seem to converge upon the same items or features.
Empiricists have held that identification of common objects of sensory experience requires extraperceptual cognition, such as inference or association. An intriguing class of cases suggests a sense in which perceptual processes themselves are multimodal. These cases reinforce the cooperative character of perceptual modalities, and ultimately help to explain multimodal unification and integration.
First, consider adaptation. When stimulation in a given modality is disrupted in order to introduce a discrepancy between experiences in two modalities, subjects adapt over time. For example, despite being disoriented when fitted with prism goggles that shift the optical scene, subjects later adapt and manage to get around normally (Helmholtz, 1866 (Helmholtz, /1925 Held, 1965) .
Adaptation involves adjustments to perceptual experience over time. Such reordering demonstrates a tendency to calibrate distinct modalities to each other, and adaptation illustrates a concern for the relationships among sense modalities. Adaptive processes are multimodal in that they reorganize experience in light of information drawn from multiple senses.
Someone might say that adaptive processes are not strictly speaking perceptual, but merely reorganize perceptual information for the purposes of action. Adaptation might involve adjustments to perceptual experience over time, but it also might just amount to the capacity to cope with disrupted perceptual stimulation in the face of discrepant experience.
A more dramatic class of cases demonstrates that the multimodality of sense perception (Welch and Warren, 1980) .
Crossmodal illusions are the most striking cases of multimodal interaction. As in the study of perception more generally, such illusions are evidence of the processes involved in normal functioning. They help to reveal perceptual principles and organization that otherwise are disguised. Indeed, explaining crossmodal illusions contributes to explaining multimodal unification and integration and draws attention to the most philosophically fruitful respects in which perception is multimodal. Interaction among the senses shows that perceiving involves not just the independent operation of discrete sense modalities. Understanding perception thus requires more than assembling accounts of the separate modalities considered in isolation from each other-it requires recognizing a unified multimodal perspective.
Crossmodal illusions
What you perceive with one modality ultimately can impact what you perceive with another. This is uncontroversial. If you see an object, you might now reach out to touch it and later taste it. When you hear a sound, you might turn and see its source. What is surprising is how directly one sense can impact another. For instance, just as a cue presented on one side of your visual field can, by attracting selective attention, enhance response time and accuracy for visual targets presented on that side (Posner, 1988) , an auditory cue presented to one side enhances response time and accuracy for visual targets presented on that side by attracting selective attention across modalities. Crossmodal cuing also operates in reverse and across other pairs of modalities (see , for review).
More strikingly, stimulation in one sense modality can cause an illusory experience in another. Vision, for instance, affects spatial aspects of experience in other modalities and frequently leads to illusions. First, it commonly causes illusory experiences of spatial location in other senses. Ventriloquism is an illusory experience of spatial location in audition that is caused by the visible location of an apparent sound source. Though best known from the case of hearing a puppeteer "throw" a voice, the ventriloquist illusion does not require speech. A flash can impact where you hear a concurrent beep. Ventriloquism is an illusory auditory experience caused by something visible (see Bertelson, 1999) . (Many are surprised to learn that ventriloquism does not involve throwing sound; it is an auditory perceptual illusion as of sound coming from a place where its apparent source is seen.) Vision also captures proprioceptive location. For example, seeing a displaced image of your hand, or seeing a rubber hand, illusorily shifts where you feel your hand to be (Hay et al., 1965; Pick et al., 1969) . Vision, however, also causes spatial illusions of shape, size, and orientation in experiences associated with other modalities (see, e.g., Rock and Victor, 1964) . In general with such crossmodal effects, differences across subjects exist for a given effect, but individual subjects are quite consistent across trials. Individuals even are consistent in their susceptibility, and in the magnitude of the effect, across different kinds of cases.
Each of the cases above is compatible with the thesis that vision wins or dominates another modality whenever a conflict exists. Deference to vision reinforces the impression that it is the primary perceptual modality, and perhaps vindicates visuocentric thinking about perception in philosophy and cognitive science.
Crossmodal effects on perceptual experience, however, are not limited to vision's impact upon other modalities, and they do not concern just spatial features. Audition, for example, leads to visual recalibrations for temporal properties. The beginning of a sound can alter when a light seems to switch on so that the light's onset seems synchronous with the sound's. A sound's duration can alter the perceived duration of a visual stimulus, and a quick beep can make a moving visible target appear to freeze (Vroomen and de Gelder 2000) . Sound also can alter visibly perceived rate and even temporal order.
One might think that crossmodal effects are limited in the following way. Vision impacts other modalities concerning spatial features, and audition impacts other modalities for temporal features. But, other modalities, including touch, can impact the experience of temporal properties in vision, and audition even interacts to some extent with proprioception for spatial features (proprioception tends to win, but not always).
Moreover, other kinds of perceptible features drive crossmodal interactions and illusions.
Qualitative characteristics can generate illusions across modalities, as when audition alters tactile experience of texture (Jousmäki and Hari, 1998; Guest et al., 2002) or a smell alters taste. The
McGurk effect is a more striking example that involves speech perception (McGurk and Macdonald 1976) . When presented with the sound of the bilabial /ba/ phoneme (pronounced with the lips together) along with incongruent video of a speaker articulating the velar /ga/ phoneme (pronounced with the tongue at the back of the palette), many listeners report experiencing clearly the sound of the alveolar /da/ phoneme (pronounced with the tongue near the front of the palette), a kind of average or compromise. The effect quickly stops when you look away from the mouth.
One modality also can influence causal impressions in another. Two disks that travel toward and past each other can look either to stream past one another or, sometimes, to bounce and rebound from one another. A sound played when the disks coincide helps resolve the ambiguity and leads to a far higher portion of bounce percepts (Sekuler, et al., 1997) .
Finally, a fascinating crossmodal illusion recently discovered by Shams et al. (2000 Shams et al. ( , 2002 results cannot be explained by extra-perceptual cognition or by subjects' adopting a strategy to help respond to ambiguous or conflicting experiences.
Explaining crossmodal illusions

Multimodal organizing principles
Crossmodal illusions take place when stimulation of one sense modality impacts perceptual experience associated with another. Sometimes, then, a process connected with one sensory system impacts a process connected with another. That means information from one sense can change how another responds.
The sound-induced flash illusion and a battery of other cases show that the predisposition towards intermodal perceptual recalibration and reconciliation is quite strong. That crossmodal effects are so prevalent indicates that crossmodal biases and illusions are neither aberrations nor mere quirks. This suggests that, if they do not just stem from accidents or miscueing, crossmodal illusions do result from processes governed by intermodal perceptual organizing principles. It also suggests that such intermodal organizing principles apply quite generally. For one, they constrain perception even under ordinary conditions when ambiguity and conflict are absent from sensory information and no recalibration occurs. For another, they apply across different sets of sense modalities. Perhaps the principles governing interactions among modalities even all share some general function or rationale. Crossmodal effects in that case reveal that inescapably multimodal processes are pervasive in perception.
It is helpful to contrast these multimodal perceptual effects with synaesthesia, another case in which stimulation in one sensory system impacts experience ordinarily associated with another. In synaesthesia, subjects enjoy, to mention a few examples, color experiences in response to sounds, sound experiences in response to colors, texture experiences in response to tastes, or tactile experiences in response to sounds (see, e.g., Baron-Cohen and Harrison 1997; Cytowic, 2002) . In contrast to crossmodal perceptual illusions, synaesthesia is relatively rare.
Synaesthesia that involves qualitative perceptual phenomenology occurs in roughly 1 in 2000
persons. More to the point, synaesthesia is a kind of experiential quirk that results from highly contingent facts about a person's sensory wiring, such as the proximity of functionally distinct pathways or brain regions. Synaesthesia differs in another important respect from crossmodal 13 illusions. The processes responsible for synaesthesia, in contrast to those responsible for crossmodal illusions, always lead to illusions. Synaesthetes do not literally hear colors or taste roughness. There is no connection between the colors of things and the colors synaesthetes experience as a result of hearing sounds. The items synaesthetes perceive usually just lack the qualities synaesthetically experienced. How, then, could synaesthesia involve perceptual principles? In contrast, crossmodal illusions result from intermodal biases and recalibrations that are not accidental. First, they concern features that actually are present and available to more than one modality. They impact the experience of features we perceive, while synaesthesia involves outright property hallucinations. Second, they in fact help to improve the accuracy of our perceptual responses given information from multiple sensory sources. Not only do hands commonly have the locations we both see and proprioceptively feel them to have, but vision's impact on other modalities concerning spatial features resolves ambiguities and corrects or minimizes perceptual conflicts and errors. Such ambiguities, conflicts, and errors might stem from differences to the resolving power, accuracy, or noisiness of sensory stimulation. That audition overrides vision for certain features or under certain conditions enhances our capacity to perceive temporal characteristics. Intermodal processes commonly even help to avoid illusion, as when vision corrects a front-back confusion in auditory localization. So, although they sometimes lead to illusion, the principles that govern intermodal processes nevertheless are intelligible as advantageous. Synaesthesia, in contrast, does not stem from processes that in general enhance the capacity to perceive. Synaesthesia, unlike ordinary intermodal biases and recalibrations, is not in this way intelligible as adaptive.
Crossmodal triggers and mechanisms
What, then, are the mechanisms by which intermodal bias is exercised and recalibration takes
place, and what are the principles that govern multimodal interaction and conflict resolution? Do any general principles exist that govern all crossmodal effects (see, e.g., Handel, 2006) ? Detailed answers to these questions currently are scarce. However, some philosophically relevant patterns are emerging.
Three primary factors are known to trigger or influence multimodal interaction (for review, details, and discussion, see, e.g., Welch and Warren, 1980; Stein and Meredith, 1993; Calvert et al., 2004; Handel, 2006) . Spatial and temporal information is most important. Being in the same place at the same time is the strongest trigger to intermodal coordination. Spatiotemporal proximity commonly cues recalibration when different senses disagree, whether the disagreement concerns space, time, or some other attribute. Perhaps this stems from two more basic principles: that two distinct things cannot occupy just the same place at the same time (cf. Bedford, 2004) , and that a single thing cannot have conflicting features.
Crossmodal interactions and illusions weaken predictably once spatial and temporal information from different senses begins to diverge. Increasing disagreement beyond some threshold leads to perceptual separation with biasing toward the dominant modality, followed by complete dissociation without biasing. Spatiotemporal information figures among bottom-up influences on multimodal processes. One interesting upshot of the spatial parameters on crossmodal interactions concerns the representation of space in different modalities. Austen Clark (forthcoming) argues that to explain crossmodal cuing of spatial selective attention, a common spatial framework must be represented as such across modalities. Perhaps a similar argument could be constructed for temporal features.
Both active and passive attention also impact the strength of crossmodal interactions and 15 illusions. Whether directed intentionally or not, attention enhances multimodal processing and strengthens the inclination to reconcile discrepant information from distinct sensory sources.
Attention facilitates feature binding, so perhaps some multimodal processes depend upon feature binding. Attention counts among top-down perceptual influences on multimodal processes.
Finally, compellingness might play a role in multimodal perception. For instance, hearing the sound of a teakettle while seeing spatially offset steam causes a stronger crossmodal spatial illusion than hearing the sound of a bell while seeing a spatially offset bell that does not vibrate in the expected way (Jackson, 1953; cited in Handel, 2006, p. 407) . Top-down cognitive factors might therefore modulate the impact of more basic features, such as spatial and temporal characteristics, on crossmodal biases and illusions. These cases also show that we need to be careful to distinguish the effects of automatic perceptual processes from those of response strategies adopted to deal with ecologically suspicious experimental tasks (see de Gelder and Bertelson, 2003) .
Physiologically, perhaps surprisingly, the mechanisms that drive crossmodal effects include connections between processes formerly thought to be modality-specific. Areas of the brain previously believed to be dedicated entirely to unimodal tasks now are known to be activated by extramodal stimuli or to respond to multimodal input. Such effects can occur quite early. For instance, V1 in the early visual system receives auditory information during the soundinduced flash experiment (Watkins et al., 2006) . Furthermore, there are neurons dedicated to receiving multimodal input, while certain areas of the brain, such as superior colliculus, play a critical role in consolidating multimodal information (see Stein and Meredith, 1993) . Top-down influences, such as processes associated with selective attention activated by one modality, also impact multiple modalities (see, e.g., Driver and Spence, 2000) . Multimodal interactions thus occur in various ways at different stages in the perceptual process, notably including those formerly thought unimodal (the essays in Calvert et al., 2004 , provide a comprehensive review).
Why multimodal interaction?
Given According to the modality appropriateness hypothesis, the modality that is most inherently appropriate for a particular kind of feature biases or dominates another when disagreement exists over that feature (see, e.g., Welch and Warren, 1980) . For instance, vision dominates audition when disagreement exists about space, and audition wins when the conflict concerns temporal features. Inherent appropriateness might appeal to physiological characteristics that make vision capable of fine spatial resolution and audition capable of fine temporal resolution. Sometimes, however, the modality that intuitively is not most appropriate for a given feature biases the one that is. Sound can impact felt texture, and vision biases speech perception, as in the McGurk effect. Furthermore, biasing effects can be reversed. Blurring vision or adding visual distractors increases auditory dominance for spatial features by decreasing visual reliability. Altering the reliability of a modality for a given feature changes dominance patterns. If appropriateness depends upon reliability, appropriateness is not an inherent characteristic of a sense modality.
In light of this, perhaps deference to the most reliable modality governs crossmodal recalibrations. If so, audition wins when it most reliably indicates a given feature, and vision wins when it does, independent from which is most inherently appropriate for a given feature. This is not quite right, either, since crossmodal recalibrations come in degrees. In fact, four patterns are common when information about some feature, such as spatial location or temporal onset, disagrees. Consider, for example, visual and auditory information about spatial location.
First, when the information differs wildly, we simply see one thing in one location and hear another thing in another location, with no attempt to resolve the disagreement. Second, when information differs significantly but not wildly, we might see something in one location and hear another thing in another location. But, in this case, one or both locations might be shifted or biased to some extent towards the other. Third, when the difference is less drastic, we might see and hear something in a common spatial location that is an average or compromise of the information stemming from the two modalities. Finally, we might see and hear something in a common spatial location that coincides with the actual location of the stimulus to one modality or the other. The first pattern involves no crossmodal bias, while the second involves bias without convergence. The third pattern involves convergence with mutual bias, while the fourth involves complete deference or dominance. The lesson is that total dominance in favor of one modality or the other in situations of conflict is not the rule. Ventriloquism, visual capture of proprioception, and McGurk effects each involve some measure of compromise.
A promising reply is that crossmodal biases and recalibrations enhance the reliability of perception in the face of noisy, fallible, or imprecise sensory stimulation. What does this involve? In ordinary cases when different senses agree, experience in each modality simply becomes more salient and detection improves. But when information conflicts and the senses do not agree, complete resolution in favor of one modality is a limit case. Frequently, averaging or weighting or some form of compromise occurs. To explain this, distinguish the reliability of a modality for a given kind of feature from the reliability of perception overall for that feature.
Deferring completely to the modality that is most reliable for a given feature does not always lead to the optimal or most reliable perceptual result. Rather, the likelihood of some worldly situation in the face of the given visual and auditory stimulation, for example, is determined by the reliability of each modality relative to the other for that feature. Enhancing the reliability of the perceptual results thus should involve a weighting of evidence from the different sources. In fact, intermodal biasing and recalibration frequently conforms to a weighting function that incorporates the relative reliability of multiple modalities in order to determine the strength of the contribution from a given modality to the perceptual compromise. Thus, for instance, visual cues might to a great extent impact the auditory experience of spatial location, while auditory cues make a significantly smaller contribution than visual cues to the visual experience of spatial location. When the reliability of each modality matches, the perceptual result in each involves averaging. Weighting functions should predict the degree to which biasing takes place, and they should explain perceptual errors caused by multimodal recalibration. In addition to the spatial and temporal crossmodal illusions, for instance, weighing both visual and auditory contributions nicely captures why a sound biases an ambiguous visual display from mostly streaming to mostly bouncing percepts, or why visual cues cause the auditory McGurk illusion even though the auditory stimulus is unequivocal. In the latter case, deference to the auditory cue arguably would make more sense given audition's strength at resolving spectral and temporal information about speech sounds. However, the compromise that occurs when a visual cue accompanies the auditory signal enhances the reliability of the resulting percept, given that each modality bears information about spoken phonemes. Similar explanations have been applied to other crossmodal illusions, including the sound-induced flash illusion (see Shams et al., 2005) . Weighting functions that enhance perceptual reliability thus show promise in explaining multimodal adjustments across a range of cases (see Handel, 2006, ch. 9 Explaining multimodal effects and principles impacts a number of other topics in the philosophy and cognitive science of perception. I want to shift from explaining multimodal interactions to explaining their impact on how we understand perception. The rest of this section argues that multimodality has consequences concerning perceptual content and phenomenology. that experiences associated with several modalities belong together or are unified in that they perceptually seem to concern common individuals and features.
Why conflict matters
Common content
Reconciling information from different senses demonstrates a perceptual concern for items or features that are common to different modalities. It is not enough that information from different senses happens to share a subject matter. Even though distinct senses bear information that differs in format and content, they must be treated as bearing commensurable information to drive reconciliation. Remarkably, amid so much divergent information across the senses, certain information streams are treated as possibly conflicting or agreeing. Conflict resolution thus implements a grasp upon information from different senses as information about the same thing.
The multimodal activity patterns involved in recalibrating and reconciling information drawn 22 from different senses amount to the exercise of a kind of perceptual grasp upon sources of sensory stimulation that are common across modalities.
Such a perceptual grasp cannot be entirely unique or specific to a given modality, since it requires, for instance, treating auditory information as sharing a source or subject matter with visual information. So, this grasp cannot be characterized entirely in modality-specific terms.
Rather, given that multimodal principles are deployed in response to information drawn from several modalities, and given that they involve treating sensory information as sharing a common subject matter, multimodal processes involve either a multi-modal or modality-independent (amodal) way of grasping the common sources of sensory stimulation. Crossmodal illusions are evidence of this grasp.
If multimodal processes exercise or implement a perceptual grasp upon common sources of sensory stimulation that is not modality-specific, this supports the claim that there exists a variety of perceptual content that cannot be captured in modality-specific terms. Some theories of content require a causal connection. Representations that result from multimodal recalibrations are causally connected to things or features accessible to more than one sense, and in a way that runs through more than one sense. Some theories require reliable or counterfactual supporting connections. Multimodal processes reliably identify and track items and features accessible to multiple modalities-auditory location, for instance, frequently responds accurately to changes in visual information about location. And they do so in a way that is transferable across modalities-you do not lose track of a basketball when you simultaneously grab it and stop looking at it. All theories of content entail satisfaction or veridicality conditions. be characterized in modality-specific terms.
Shared phenomenology
I have been discussing perceptual processing, explanation, and content. What about perceptual experience? Some intentionalist theories hold that perceptual phenomenology supervenes upon perceptual content (see, e.g., Harman, 1990; Dretske, 1994; Tye, 2000; Byrne, 2001 ). If multimodal perception shows that perceptual experiences associated with different senses can share content, intentionalism therefore implies that they also must share perceptual phenomenology. This consequence has been used to argue against intentionalism (see, e.g, Lopes, 2000; O'Dea, 2006) . It is intuitive to think that we perceptually experience things and features in ways that are distinctive to each modality. Even if we can see and touch the same thing, and even if something common must figure in the contents of sight and touch, it is natural to suspect there is a distinctively visual way of experiencing it and a different, recognizably tactual way of experiencing it. That is, even if common sensibles figure in common contents, there are still different ways of perceptually experiencing or entertaining them with different senses. Some respond with an intramodal restriction to the intentionalist thesis. Despite intuition, however, multimodal cases ground a different intentionalist response.
Consciously perceiving something to be blue, or to be illuminated on its left side, or to occlude part of a surface, surely involves a distinctively visual experience. Perceiving something as high-pitched, or as loud, involves a distinctively auditory experience. Since, at a time, in everyday conditions, one's visual or auditory experiences arguably all involve at least some modality-specific phenomenological features, the overall phenomenology of visual or auditory experience arguably is distinctive. Nevertheless, it is mistaken to hold that perceptual phenomenology is exhausted by modality-specific phenomenology. For ordinary perceivers, in whom perceptual principles govern multimodal bias, interaction, and reconciliation, perceptual experiences include phenomenological characteristics that must be shared by or common to experiences associated with different senses.
So far, I have argued that we perceive common items that are perceptually grasped or represented as common across multiple modalities. This is required to explain conflict and reconciliation. But, one might argue that common content is compatible with distinctive phenomenological character for every pair of perceptual experiences that occur in distinct modalities. Crossmodal illusions then might stem from lower-level causal and informational processes that adjust phenomenologically distinctive experiences in one or more modalities. That causal interaction takes place between processes that lead to experiences in different senses, and that explaining those interactions requires positing grasping or representing as of common items, might not be reflected as such in phenomenology. Causal influence does not imply a constitutively dependent experience. On a traditional picture, each sense contributes something entirely distinctive, and sense-specific contributions exhaust overall experience. Perhaps the traditional picture is safe.
However, evidence exists that multimodal sharing is reflected even in perceptual experience and that perceptual phenomenology is not exhausted by modality-specific characteristics. Consider cases in which intermodal binding takes place. Just as distinct features drawn from a single modality, such as color and shape, are intramodally bound in visual experience-a single perceptible thing seems to have both color and shape, and to be distinct from other things that have color and shape-features drawn from different senses, such as visible shape and felt texture, sometimes perceptibly belong to a single item thanks to intermodal binding (see, e.g., Pourtois et al., 2000) . The very same thing perceptually seems to have features drawn from more than one sense modality. That which is experienced to have a visible feature is experienced also to have a tactile feature (or an audible feature). That which bears the visible feature is identified with that which bears the tactile feature, so a single thing is experienced as having both visible and tactile features. In order to capture the phenomenology of cases in which intermodal binding takes place, some aspect of perceptual phenomenology must account for the experiential sense in which the item seen is the very same item touched. That is, some aspect of perceptual phenomenology is common to the visual experience and the tactual experience. It corresponds to whatever is experienced as having both visible and tactile features. This aspect of perceptual phenomenology might itself be multimodal in nature, or it might have an entirely amodal character. Either way, distinctive sense-specific characteristics do not jointly exhaust the phenomenology of perceptual experience. Either experiences associated with different senses share at least some aspects of phenomenological character, or perceptual experiences are not exhausted by distinctive phenomenological characteristics that are specific to individual 27 modalities (see O'Callaghan, 2008b ).
This, however, implies that considering purely visual cases and invoking properly visual characteristics does not suffice to characterize the phenomenology even of visual perceptual awareness. That approach abstracts from the context of other modalities and thus ignores their contributions to integrated multimodal perceptual experience. Not only do we assess vision and visual experience from the perspective of multimodal awareness, but visual experience itself cannot exhaustively be characterized, understood, or explained without comprehending its role in integrated multimodal perceptual experience. A complete account of vision and visual experience requires constitutive relationships among modalities.
The senses
Multimodal perception, especially crossmodal interactions and illusions, bears on how we understand the nature of the senses.
Are the senses modular?
One might be tempted to think the senses are modular (for instance, in the sense of Fodor, 1983 Fodor, , 2000 . The senses often are mentioned as examples of mental modules. Suppose you hold that perception in general is modular and thus impenetrable by beliefs and other forms of cognition.
And suppose you hold that the processes associated with each sense are specific or dedicated to that sensory domain and that they operate mostly independently from other senses. Then you might hold that audition, for instance, is informationally encapsulated and impenetrable by information from other sensory domains. You might count audition among the modules.
This view is far too strong. Multimodal processes involve causal interaction and 28 information transmission among sensory systems. Perceptual processing in vision is shaped and changed by auditory information. Connections between sensory systems exist at numerous physiological locations and at different functional or computational stages. Shimojo and Shams (2001) argue explicitly against what they call the historically prevalent view that the sense modalities are distinct modules on the grounds of multimodal plasticity and interaction.
However, it is difficult to find work that advocates such a strong version of the modularity thesis for the senses. Some hold that only an early part of the visual system is modular (e.g., Pylyshyn, 1999) . Some hold that even early vision's modularity depends upon a number of distinct systems working in concert that detect, for example, color, motion, edges, and form. In that case, early vision itself employs a number of modules. Perhaps it is no surprise that complete sensory systems fail to act as strict modules. Multimodal effects make trouble only if you believe that all perceptual modules are modality-specific. But on a weakened modularity view, why maintain this? Perhaps, while vision, audition, smell, taste, touch, and proprioception are not strictly modular, functional modules responsive to common multimodal or amodal features and individuals, such as space, time, objects, and events (and perhaps even perceived language), might exist. This would seem necessary to uphold even a less-than-massively modular view of the mind on which perceptual systems are distinguished from higher cognition by their modularity (see, e.g., Fodor, 2000) . The important upshot is that modules specific to vision, audition, and the rest do not exhaust perceptual capacities. Certain critical perceptual processes require input from several sensory systems and impact experience associated with multiple modalities. In addition to any sense-specific functions, perception involves multisensory tasks. things perceived with some other extra-visual modality, and that textures and form tactually seem to belong to things we feel. Some also might find it odd to say that an amodal or multimodal modality exists in addition to the traditional senses.
Individuating the senses
Heil (1983) suggests we individuate the senses in terms of the physical energy to which they respond; Keeley (2002) suggests we individuate the senses in terms of organs evolutionarily dedicated to picking up information of a certain kind. Neither of these accounts strictly conflicts with the multimodal results discussed above, but once we take them to apply to perceptual systems, multimodal processes become a problem. The end sense organs are not hooked up to functionally discrete systems that are dedicated to responding to unique information or features in the way that the eye responds to light, the ears to mechanical pressure waves, and the nose to chemicals. Multimodal perceptual processes discern and respond to constancies and commonalities in stimulation across sense organs. Individuating senses either by end organs or by physical energy types therefore does not suffice to individuate corresponding perceptual systems. Since the senses on such accounts are not perceptual modalities, their theoretical interest to psychology and philosophy is minimized. Seeing interests philosophers and cognitive scientists not just because it involves having an organ that responds to light, but because seeing 31 is a way of perceiving.
Matthew Nudds (2003) argues that, given trouble individuating the senses, we should say that the senses are conventional categories we treat as different ways of perceiving. Nevertheless, knowing that someone is seeing is informative because it suggests to us the kinds of things they are likely to perceive, such as colors, shapes, and objects. Knowing someone is hearing makes it more likely that they perceive pitches, sounds, and events. But we should resist thinking the senses correspond to physiologically or psychologically real kinds. The senses, on this view, are no more than folk psychological concepts with limited value to empirical science. Though unsettling, and though Nudds's argument from the failure of extant accounts does not rule out deeper similarities and differences that ground conventional distinctions among the senses, multimodal aspects of perception might lend support to this line of thought.
In light of this, perhaps we should restrict talk of the senses to low-level systems such as the eye and very early visual processes, which can be individuated as Heil and Keeley suggest.
But these senses are not perceptual modalities, and they do not correspond neatly to categories of experience. Seeing, hearing, and the rest are ways of perceiving whose individuation might be messy in the way Nudds suggests. Perceiving, therefore, might be essentially multimodal in that it essentially involves principles and processes that span multiple sensory systems.
Multimodality and perception
In summary, crossmodal illusions demonstrate that perception involves interactions among processes associated with different modalities. Patterns of crossmodal bias and recalibration reveal the organization of multimodal perceptual processes. Multimodal interactions obey intelligible principles; they resolve conflicts; they enhance the reliability of perception; they are 32 not mere quirks or accidents. Multimodal processes also demonstrate a concern across the senses for common features and individuals, for the following reason. The intermodal biasing and recalibration responsible for crossmodal illusions requires that information from sensory stimulation associated with different senses is grasped or represented as being commensurable.
Since conflict resolution requires a common subject matter, commensurable information from different senses shares or traces to a common source. Crossmodal processes thus amount to the exercise of a principled perceptual grasp upon the common sources of sensory stimulation across modalities.
Further philosophical work is needed to characterize the varieties of multimodality and their bearing on traditional theories of perception, perceptual experience, and the senses. The implications for research methodology are clear: studying the various modalities in isolation reveals just the surface of the story about perception. Philosophical and empirical work thus should not proceed on the assumption that it is possible to understand perception and perceptual experience in terms of a single modality entirely in isolation from the others. For one, it is not possible simply to extrapolate or translate claims about vision into claims about other modalities.
Moreover, vision itself may resist an exhaustive understanding that does not appeal to non-visual modalities. Without recognizing perception's deep multimodality, we overlook the role of the several senses in perception.
What does this mean for how we understand the nature of perception? Handel (2006) says perceiving is about solving correspondence problems through the detection of contrast and change. A correspondence problem is one of identifying an individual or feature, either at a time or over time, given sensory information that varies from location to location and from moment to Here is a start. One upshot deals with the relationships among experiences commonly associated with different modalities. Just as perceiving colors and visual-objects involves detecting constancies in hue and shape despite variations and changes in appearance due to lighting and viewing angle, perceiving ordinary objects and events implicates constancies in features detected with different senses, across changes to the modality with which one perceives.
Without appeal to such constancies, shifting sense modalities would perceptually seem to result in altogether different objects of experience. If different modalities shared no intentional objects or features, perceptual experience would in one noteworthy way seem fragmented. We would perceive no relationships among things experienced through different modalities. Our sense of the cohesiveness of the world as we perceive it through different senses therefore depends upon our perceptually keeping track of common items and features across different modalities. One very critical aspect of perceptual experience thus stems from multimodal functioning. Objectual unity is tied to our capacity to detect constancies and solve correspondence problems across modalities.
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Another upshot deals with the nature of experiences associated with a given modality.
We perceptually identify and keep track of things despite contrasts in sensory information and in presentation across modalities. This, I argued, grounds varieties of perceptual content and phenomenology that are common to perceptual experiences associated with different modalities.
It follows that characterizing perceptual content and perceptual phenomenology requires appeal to terms beyond those that are proprietary to a given modality. Characterizing an ordinary occasion of perceiving by means of audition therefore requires appeal to terms that are not inherently auditory. Talk of sounds, pitch, timbre, loudness, and audible-location, whose perceptual significance is purely auditory, needs to be supplemented with talk of sound sources-objects that make sounds, or events of sound production-and locations shared with vision. A similar claim holds for vision. We might therefore be justified in saying that we can visually perceive something as the sort of thing that could have auditory, tactual, olfactory, or gustatory qualities, rather than as something with visual significance alone. Likewise, one might hear something as the sort of thing that could be seen or touched. So, the experience of perceiving with one modality can embody perceptual expectations that implicate another. For instance, seeing a convincing hologram invites expectations that are violated when you learn you can put your hand through it without resistance. Such visual expectations are perceptual, rather than just results of extra-perceptual cognition or association. The scope of experiences associated with a given modality, as a result, might be far greater than traditional views imagine.
Solving crossmodal correspondence problems, on the approach I have discussed, requires a common amodal or multimodal code that is shared among modalities. The proprietary or distinctive aspects of sense perception and experience thus may distract from what is most noteworthy about perceiving. Perhaps it is in grasping multiple sensory perspectives as 35 perspectives upon a common source that the world becomes available as a subject for attention, empirical belief, and action. If so, perceiving is a thoroughly multimodal affair.
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